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Abstract
Recent developments in computational power have been applied to Shakespearean 
studies in such a way as to demonstrate that unprecedented collation and insight 
into authorial work will occur. This will generate a renewed emphasis on authorial 
intention and reviewing the canon, two traditions which have been reduced to mere 
concepts by the regnant schools of reader-response criticism and pure aesthetics. A 
glance at Stanley Fish’s new Milton book and the state of G. M. Hopkins’ criticism 
confirms that the academy is still committed to predominantly deconstruction 
and discipline segregation for English study. The author uses several various issues 
arising and several poetical meter studies to sketch a possible means of re-uniting 
pure English studies and empirical sciences like linguistics in fruitful dialogue.
Key words: canon, computational linguistics, empiricism, Hayes, Hopkins, idiolect, 
Kiparsky, metrics, Milton, Shakespeare. 
HABLÁNDOLE SIN PAUSA A LAS DISCIPLINAS EMPÍRICAS
Resumen 
Los recientes desarrollos del poder computacional se han aplicado a estudios 
de Shakespeare para demostrar que una labor comparativa y un enfoque sin 
precedentes ocurrirán en el trabajo autorial. Esto generará un renovado énfasis en 
la intención autorial y el canon crítico, dos tradiciones que las escuelas reinantes 
de crítica lector-repuesta y estética pura redujeron a meros conceptos. Una mirada 
al nuevo libro de Stanley Fish sobre Milton y al planteamiento crítico de G. M. 
Hopkins confirma que la academia aún está comprometida predominantemente con 
la deconstrucción y la segregación de la disciplina en el estudio del inglés. El autor 
utiliza temas muy diversos que están surgiendo y numerosos estudios de métrica 
poética para esbozar un posible medio de re-unir los estudios de inglés puro y las 
ciencias empíricas como la lingüística en un diálogo fructífero.
Palabras clave: canon, empirismo, Hayes, Hopkins, idiolecto, Kiparsky, lingüística 
computacional, métrica, Milton, Shakespeare.
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Introduction
English studies have a “new” challenge. The growing mass of online databases, 
texts, and dictionaries is on trajectory to collide with the fields of critical theory 
and aesthetics. In this developing scenario, computative power has rendered the 
study of mega-patterns feasible, patterns formerly intuited or configured primar-
ily through Promethean, discursive intellect. Although the current academe may 
wish to confine such ballooning research discretely to computational linguistics 
or linguistic attribution studies (e.g., who was Shakespeare really?), there is also a 
possibility for renewed attention to authorial intent and the “Canon”. By having 
massive searchable texts available not just across writers but periods, as well as more 
sophisticated and powerful search engines, branches of linguistics will be able to 
present compelling snapshots of certain ways poetic minds work, and it will be 
possible to test aspects of critical interpretive claims about the supposed necessity 
or non-necessity of the Canon. Intuited criticism will now have sharply focused 
empirical studies concerning similarities or dissimilarities, and may itself be the 
subject of such study. The dynamics of Canon formation and even critical response 
will lie more open to new evaluation. It is no happenstance that Lancashire (1997) 
invoked the authorial-intention question at the end of his “Empirically Determin-
ing Shakespeare’s Idiolect”: 
Literary criticism over the past two hundred years has increasingly lost faith in an 
author’s presence in the works the author wrote. Most Shakespeareans do not believe 
that their author is dead, but that he is present, somehow, in the plays and poems he 
created. The academy tends nonetheless to be skeptical about critical claims to have 
detected him or his style or his mind objectively in the texts we have, despite the fact 
that we all routinely award course grades, degrees, and honors on the basis of some-
one’s authorship of a text how ironical that an academy valuing authorship so highly 
among its own shies away from studying it. (p. 193)
Lancashire has overseen the Text Analysis Computing Tools (TACTweb) and 
the Early Modern English Dictionary Database (set up in 1993). He was looking 
for phrasal repetends, chunks of around 6-7 words which are not consciously used 
by Shakespeare but arise as part of the unconscious use of language which repre-
sents the unique way each brain stores the associative memory (drawing on Steven 
Pinker’s research & theory). Obvious suggested implications are that the draconian 
separation of disciplines that has persisted so long in English studies between pure 
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aesthetics or pure critical theory and the harder sciences like neurobiology or lin-
guistics has the potential to alter drastically very soon, which is to say that the tools 
of the Enlightenment are going to render theoretical Enlightenment humanism 
subject to its own putative/derived cutting edge. Computational power, statistics, 
and sheer availability could render current prevailing paradigms “redundant” as 
surely as Higher Criticism forced theology to revisit assumptions about the nature 
of divine revelation. 
Not coincidentally, Craig (2009), Director of the University of Newcastle 
in South Australia’s Center for Literacy and Linguistic Computing, noted as an 
aside in one of his works on the subject of Shakespeare that Stanley Fish’s school 
of critical theory had a positive hostility towards empirical “stylistics”. This is 
because, among other things, S. Fish and others are committed to a particular 
critique of tradition which cannot espouse past authority in a struggle with empiri-
cal studies. They must keep the aesthetic values inherited from the tradition they 
have subsumed, but must them selves not fall prey to the empirical encroachment 
which they may have employed in the process of assuming regnancy. Craig (not 
unnaturally) wonders out loud why empirical studies could not simply recognize 
interpretive modes and cultural aspects in texts: 
It is possible, however, to propose an alternative motivation for stylistics, that 
is, the uncovering of patterns of language use which because of their “background” 
quality, or their emergence on a superhumanly wide scale, would otherwise not be 
noticed; and the testing of hypotheses about language use where some empirical vali-
dation seems possible and appropriate. An example of the former would be patterns 
of use of thou and you forms within one dramatist; an example of the latter would 
be curiosity about whether men and women write differently from one another. This 
need not be anti-humanist. 
Noteworthy is that Craig also addressed authorial intention in his stylistic 
analysis (Principal Component Analysis) of Shakespeare’s works, and here the 
connection with Stanley Fish (a luminary of English academics and the practi-
cal originator of an influential school of reader-response criticism) becomes more 
explicit. His 1967 work on Milton launched his career at Duke, which was spent 
creating a department filled with alternative readings on the classics by overtly 
non-disinterested parties. Oates (2001) noted, in his review of S. Fish’s latest work 
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on Milton that Fish has modified his views in what might seem like a counter-
intuitive way:
...not only is there a text in his class but a canonical one to boot, but even 
more startlingly, any advocacy of ungoverned, free-for-all interpretation using the 
reader-response criticism now comes with a Satanic pedigree. 
However, even in this latest discourse on Milton, for Fish empiricism was still 
the enemy: 
Whenever a character in Milton’s poetry seeks to avoid coming to terms with his 
or her creature-hood in order to claim a measure (however small) of independence, he 
or we will have recourse to empirical reasoning. Thus Satan says to Eve, “look on me” 
(IX, 687), inviting her to substitute the observation of physical processes (in this case 
illusory) for the first principles she is pledged to maintain. Eve, in her turn, makes 
literal the substitution when she offers its logic (along with the apple) to Adam: “On 
my experience... freely taste” (988). Mammon performs the first physicalist reduction, 
designed specifically to exclude any recognition of deity and spirit, when he resolves to 
build a new heaven from the raw materials of hell, a resolution that makes sense to him 
because his conception of heaven is so relentlessly material: “what can Heaven show 
more?” (II, 273) ...the entire account of the Fall of the angels points to that conclusion: 
that the decision for or against God starts with an interpretation of God and then 
all the evidence of the outside world is marshalled to support that conclusion. (2009)
Fish wanted to defend Milton’s empyreal moral vision of the inner choice for 
God, which paradoxically turns out to be something very difficult to attain to be-
cause of our human propensity to read false/other gods out of our inner resources. 
For Fish, authenticity in the humanities is a matter of vision, however difficult, 
and not one of more data. It is unlikely that he would have much use for cross-talk 
across the disciplines; English (or Miltonic for that matter) studies has the inner 
resources to wrestle with its own inner demons. This current distrust towards other 
disciplines in this academic branch runs roughly as follows: 
Stanley Fish summarizes the current position (for a more rounded, historical 
account of the marginalization of the aesthetic in literary studies, see Murray Krieger’s 
paper on the subject): “These days being an apologist for poetry means resisting the 
various historicism —old, new, cultural, material— whose expansive arguments are 
made at the expense of the aesthetic, a category (and area) that either disappears in 
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the analysis of ‘discursive systems’ or is identified (and stigmatized) as the location of 
a status-quo politics anxious to idealize its own agendas. (In Hurley, 2009)
He specifically fingers linguistics as pushing a “scientism” (at the behest of 
“publish or perish” demands on teachers) that has endangered the aesthetic ap-
preciation of poetry, an appreciation restored (in Hurley’s view) by the recitation 
of poetry out loud. Supposedly, the top teachers retreated from teaching and com-
peted in scholarship for a difficult and competitive market, leaving the field open 
for cross discipline take-over bids. Both Northrop Frye and TVF Brogan are cited 
as authorities agreeing with this line of thought, and at one point Hurley calls the 
“linguistic turn” the “enemy within”. 
If linguists have no interest in assaulting the “beauteous form of things”, and 
aver their good intentions and limited objectives, where is the literary angst coming 
from? Perhaps one can answer this partly, by asking questions of those who are 
concerned. What would “systematic criticism”, in the absence of tradition, ideology, 
or empirical studies, look like? How is the holding of poetry “slams” or recitals 
going to help the situation? In the absence of Canonical authority (or something 
approaching it close enough to make another word choice a semanticism) what 
lines of possible defense (should a need arise) against empiricism or reductionism 
in English exist? 
This Gordian knot may seem even un-cuttable, but it is hardly “new”. The 
devious nature of language and communication was tentatively explored long ago 
in Plato’s dialogue Cratylus, and Socrates himself was prejudiced enough against 
the tyranny of the text as a means to Truth to leave behind himself no scrap of 
writing. Later in the West, Constantine’s donation was invalidated by the inventor 
of stylometry, Lorenzo Valla, while the modern debate over the textus receptus of the 
Bible is ample demonstration of the potential warp and woof of the “new” prob-
lems. Higher criticism and empirical studies are inseparable in this meta context. 
The telescoping of centuries and the invalidation of longstanding pieties renders 
every humane discipline “touchable” by empirical technique. How “touchable” 
they are, and whether influence flows in the opposite direction, is another matter. 
The now regnant principal narratives in the Academy primarily derive from 
the strongly disciplined drift of a system which has more or less operated one 
way for a mere hundred years. It is hard not to conceive that just as the library of 
Alexandria’s loss affected the Dark Ages, the printing press altered the Medieval 
Era, or the exclusion of Latin from Oxford helped configure modern Academe, 
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so massive computing power will likely shift the intellectual landscape/mental 
furniture in even “pure” disciplines. Computational power and old age have this 
in common - they are in command of more data (with less emotion) than young 
scholars trying to say something completely nouveau. Fish’s latest book may well 
be a criticism of his younger self, to a degree. 
It is pointless to reassure the humanists that their fears are unfounded. Un-
derstandably, the point is not to invalidate critical theory or aesthetics entirely/es-
sentially but to note that it appears that these enormous databases will be searched 
and collated to reveal meta-patterns which may potentially be “new”, and “new” 
enough to change thinking or generate new fields. The computer won’t interpret on 
its own, but it will allow sorting of data in such a way as to potentially raise vastly 
different questions on vastly new scales. It will sharpen criticisms which would 
otherwise not have been generated under the current system of a purely creative 
confrontation. Embattled texts and opining readers will be somewhat displaced in a 
climate more likely resembling the early 1900s, in which a great deal of energy was 
spent doing historical background work on literature. What would before have been 
white noise/static to the re-interpreting and free ranging single mind could fall out 
in a more incontrovertible order. It will even be possible to use computational power 
(including linguistics) to collate bodies of criticism itself. A telescoping of the entire 
field/criticism will be made possible, as well as a corresponding micro-scoping. The 
fact that it will be done more quickly and efficiently will not undermine its impor-
tance, for it will be readily available. Powerfully programmed super-computers with 
more or less reasonable parameters will begin to possess and collate the (theorized) 
invisible margins of the text. In short, computers will begin to do more of the grunt 
work of the mind. Irreplaceable as the mind on its own terms, it is also limited in 
certain ways that computers are not. Sheer memory, for one thing. 
One now is forced to wonder (in the face of this inter-disciplinary opportunity/
impasse): were all clear alternatives placed on the table and duly considered? When 
Stanley Fish and the poststructuralists rose to dominance in English studies, were 
they completely in command of the available resources? Although tendentious, 
Paglia (2009) said this of the current standoff: 
Most seriously, poststructuralism did manifest damage to two generations of 
students who deserved a generous and expansive introduction to the richness of the 
humanities and who were instead force-fed with cynicism and cant. I fail to see that 
American students are emerging today even from elite universities with a broad or dis-
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cerning knowledge of arts and letters. Nor has poststructuralism produced any major 
new critics—certainly none of the towering scholarly stature once typical of prominent 
professors who had been educated in the first half of the twentieth century. (p. 1) 
In her earlier essay on the Classics, she went even further: 
The actual mechanics of canon-formation over time were either unknown or 
ignored: in point of fact, major writers and artists have rarely possessed or were sig-
nificant beneficiaries of power in the political sense; in most cases (as in that of the 
embittered Dante) they were eccentrics or social failures... We declare something is 
important and assign it to the curriculum when we find evidence of its influence on 
other artists. In other words, the canon is really about artistic or intellectual fertility; 
it’s the dynasty of works that have generated other works. (p. 4) 
Paglia may or may not be correct, but it is certain that the issue of the modern 
understanding of what the Canon was, and why and how it needed to be obviated 
was at the heart of the modern retreat into aestheticism. She is surely right to raise 
the issue of Canon formation (as Craig is right to raise the issue of authorial intent), 
because if English persists in attempting to arbitrarily exclude stylistics and empiri-
cal studies from certain complex discussions with multi-disciplinary implications 
(something it is hard to conceive will not happen), it will tend to raise the very 
criticism it is seeking to avoid. After all, it was empirical studies which were at 
the forefront of the historicism which helped unseat antique Traditionalism. Why 
would one wish to forego it now? 
A positive way to put this is that a text inherits some form of materiality wheth-
er it or the reader wishes it to or not. Barring the presence of strong authorial intent 
and corresponding tradition (the talk of the dead), the empirical disciplines are 
strongly poised to give a more satisfactory account of this latent materiality in Eng-
lish studies, which may be why Stanley Fish is re-thinking Milton now. Materiality 
is not necessarily the same thing as rank empiricism, but neither is it a prominent 
feature in pure humanities right now. Abstractions and re-interpretations dominate. 
Having excluded nostalgic arguments (“we should study Shakespeare because so 
many of our words we owe to his genius”) as not abstract enough (critically refined 
to treat the subject of study as pure object), abstractions don’t want a backdoor 
materiality coming in through empirical studies. For after all, the above “nostalgia” 
could be re-formulated and “proven” empirically in a dramatic fashion. 
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Rethinking is perennially in order, even about re-thinking. Paglia (2009) was 
right to suggest that canon formation and its attendant graces (aesthetical and 
critical theory) more properly go (and once went) hand in hand. Lacking a canon, 
a concrete image or icon to defend, it is difficult to remain on firm footing against 
the encroachments of either kindred or alien disciplines, or to even allow them 
temporary access. It is better to hermetically seal off the ivory tower. As Umberto 
Eco asks us in one of his essays, is there anything more like a medieval monastery 
today than a university? Or better yet, a department? Without authors or a canon, 
both aesthetics and critical theory become ultra-fragile substitutes for the former 
“whole-person” narrative of “Mediterranean Man”. The venerable model was no 
doubt flawed, but at least it reckoned with materiality in both text and author. 
The reader was expected to read, and to read a corpus. This corpus was material 
in a subliminal sense, and therefore not inherently averse to empirical studies or 
committed to stand-alone aesthetics. 
The real irony is that it is the academy, not the canon, that is too rigid, for 
the academy wishes to preserve classical value and form without classical content 
or continuity. This un-negotiable and over-rigid position renders them vulnerable 
(and redundant) to empirical disciplines. Achieving perfectly “unequal” status vis 
a vis empirical studies has actually made them perfectly ideal targets. Linguistics 
is obviously still interested in canonical poetry, and one study is even using Gerard 
Manley Hopkins’ idiolectical patterns to help us better understand the processes 
of autism (Chew, 2009). This seems an odd “spiritual” use for his poetry, but it 
is perhaps consonant with the authors’ intentions in ways that portraying him as 
a herald of universal language-failure is not. In fact the entire linguistic fields of 
“universal grammar” and idiolects in themselves could be said (in some sense) to 
be dissonant with the regnant English schools of “community interpretations”, 
post structuralism, and special interest studies. The empirical disciplines will keep 
“encroaching” because they are empirical and rightly so. They mitigate against 
too much abstraction. They inherit an abandoned materiality. Paglia (2009) may 
have an axe to grind, but a studied glance at the state of thinking about a poet like 
Hopkins (who is excessively preoccupied with materiality in language) shows that 
he is often interpreted simply in light of modern problems, outlooks, and predilec-
tions. If he is seen at all on his own terms, he becomes merely a harbinger of the 
collapse of older modes of thought. 
Both Korg and Sprinker (1980) —who reviewed Korg (1977)— take this line 
of approach, and both focus on the last of his “Dark Sonnets”. They find it easy to 
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play with the idea that Hopkins had “failed” at his task. Korg and Sprinker both 
explored, in counterpoint to each other, the strange question of whether Hopkins 
succeeded at his theological artistic task of drawing out the sacral nature of lan-
guage. Although Korg went to long lengths to demonstrate that the “Dark Son-
nets” show how Hopkins faltered near the end, he didn’t go far enough to satisfy 
Sprinker. Both focus on “Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the 
Resurrection” as a key text. Sprinker admitted that Korg had the central insight 
into the autonomy of language (language as being inherently self referential), but 
saw Korg’s qualification that a certain external “referential” quality of language 
“is never wholly escaped” as vitiating his argument. Of course, Sprinker couldn’t 
really improve on things. 
The language of Hopkins’s poem is generated by a process of analogical cor-
respondence in which the poem creates a heterocosm, a world structurally parallel 
to, but ontologically distinct from, objects of representation... Hopkins poetry is 
bound in what Nietzsche calls the prison-house of language... it is not at all certain 
that Hopkins doesn’t go as far as Mallarme in establishing a non-representational 
language for poetry (128). 
And just what is the difference between “structurally parallel” and “ontologi-
cally distinct”? Where is the concluding philosophical postscript in either of these 
articles? Or in Fish’s book on Milton? It is certainly true that no one can accuse 
these authors of dogmatism. They are consistently anti-foundationalist, in that they 
accept aesthetics and critical theory as a sort of replacement for faltering high Art 
and failing traditional philosophy. 
Without tendentious opining, it’s possible to simply note that not every poet 
(let alone human) in the twentieth century was convinced (with Nietzsche) that 
language is a prison. Two quick supporting points are now in order, concerning 
the state of ars poetica. First, the Renaissance had always emphasized “both sides 
now”. In fact, the essence of a humanist education was centered on classical rheto-
ric employed in set pieces both for and against, and consequently concerned with 
discerning (like Solomon) who told the truth. Shakespeare was a product of this, 
as Martindale and Taylor (2004) and Rhodes (2004) confirmed. Long before the 
Enlightenment or postmodern critical theory, classical education dealt with the 
issue at the heart of education. Secondly, since (unlike today) this education placed 
a good deal of faith in the correspondence of word/text with realia, a belief that 
manifested as an interest in hermetic traditions, the esoteric, and even magic (Co-
vino, 1988), it is not obvious to see why Hopkins is not part of an earlier, rather than 
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a later, tradition. Though he is admitted to be often preoccupied with “modern” 
problems, yet if realia itself has a self-referential aspect, then the fact that language 
shares this kind of quantum reflexivity is rather a proof of the word’s kinship with 
the numinous, rather than a disturbing indication that another dead end has been 
reached. Why should Hopkins’ lapse into silence at his discovery of the arbitrary 
aspect of language mean precisely what it means to us? We often attribute “cor-
respondence naivety” to earlier poets when it comes to realia because we frame 
them as part of our own story of journey into disbelief. But this is precisely the 
opposite view which they themselves took towards writers from the past, foreign or 
native. For Shakespeare, and even for someone as late as Hopkins, a writer from 
the past was present, no matter how imperfectly, in the ancient tome or scrap. It 
seems unwise to solely review their personal developments as mimicking or pre-
heralding a modern style.
The fact that some poets/humanists like James Joyce did/do trencher-work in 
the material canon rather badly means little, just as it does not matter that some 
empiricist often mingle their own ideology with their legitimate research. The Cold 
War era linguistic scientist Stuart Chase sensed a target in Joyce. After leaning on 
Alfred Korzybski to assert that the analytic English language of subject-predicate 
lead to bad philosophical conclusions using Aristotelian, discrete, either/or logic 
(1956:129-131), he quoted IA Richards to assert that “the view that meanings belong 
to words in their own right is a branch of sorcery, a relic of the magical theory of 
names” (135). Then he dragged James Joyce out to cinch the argument. Joyce had 
disastrously attempted to flout not only traditional grammar but even the basic 
phonemic syllabification inherent in our surrounding cultural horizon: 
Had he understood the culture concept he would never have attempted it 
(Finnegan’s Wake); he would have realized that he was out of bounds. Here is a 
sample of his laboratory work: “The fall (bab ba ba da l g h a r a g h t a k a m m i n 
a rr o n n k o n n b r o n n t o n n e r r o n n ...” This is Joyce trying to symbolize 
the original Fall of Man (98). 
This was the same Stuart Chase who proclaimed his agreement with LM Myers 
that “linguists and anthropologists have disproved the naive theory of one universal 
grammar underlying all languages” (97). Unfortunately, this was immediately prior 
to Chomsky’s introduction of universal grammar studies. 
Chomsky has reintroduced the idea of virtual and intangible entities in an 
empirical discipline. Something like this insight must have operated behind the 
long Western tradition (originating with the Celts) of linking rhyme with epic or 
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religious hymns, no matter how badly James Joyce may have botched it. So let us 
take a better and more contemporary example in poetic studies that isn’t so easy 
to dismiss on its own terms. Touching the tradition of rhyme, Isak Dinesen (Out 
of Africa) related that: 
One evening, out in the maize-field, where we had been harvesting maize, brea-
king off the cobs and throwing them on to the ox-carts, to amuse myself, I spoke to 
the field laborers, who were mostly very young, in Swahili verse. There was no sense 
in the verse, it was made for the sake of the rhyme... it caught the interest of the boys, 
they formed a ring around me. They (...) waited eagerly for the rhyme, and laughed at 
it when it came. I tried to make them themselves find the rhyme and finish the poem 
which I had begun, but they could not, or would not (...) as they had become used to 
the idea of poetry, they begged: ‘Speak again. Speak like rain’. (Kennedy, 1992, p. 1) 
Or, from a living neo-formalist poet (talking to an army psychologist he wished 
to believe him crazy): 
What a firm grip this humble psychiatric tester had on the very private parts of 
Truth! ...The poet discovers what he thinks when he writes: he is borne (perhaps I 
mean born) into what he believes by the rhyme, the rhythm, the eloquence of what 
he is saying... Ezra Pound as I remember said it was impossible to translate Villon 
because Villon always rhymed on the meaning. (Moore)
Properly understood, any subject stands upon its own merits, and yet also 
depends (for its vindication) on a respectful interest, distance, and interplay from 
other disciplines. There is no obviously necessary war between poetry, critical 
theory, and linguistics. There could be a kind of perichoresis, in which individual 
subjects are both illuminated, interpenetrated, and yet set apart by other disciplines. 
This is illustrated by the many linguistic studies on English poetical meter, which 
confirm that the great masters’ ears were telling them what was really there, dif-
ferently, but together, for each of them. 
For counter-intuitively to the modern bias, the English poetic tradition is re-
markable in how much individual poets vary in their correspondence rules - every 
poet possesses to some degree a ‘metrical idiolect’ (Hayes, 1983, p.3). Following 
Kiparsky (1977) Hayes identified several “filters” that are used by strong English 
poets in their mature verse. Kiparksy and Hayes have identified patterns peculiar 
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enough to call Milton I and II, Shakespeare I and II, etc. “All filters have the effect 
of forbidding linguistic s in metrical w position” (p. 359). He has examined Word-
sworth, Pope, Poe and Spenser as well. They share commonalities but (for example) 
Spenser is less picky than Shakespeare who is less picky than Milton. Using Kipar-
sky’s metrical trees, he adds a grid system to explain “arbitrary disjunction” from 
those trees for better explanatory power in dealing with exceptions to Kiparsky’s 
otherwise admirable system. He demonstrated a remarkable predictable power in 
discriminating whether a given poet will employ a certain stress in a given situation. 
This kind of sturdy empiricism mitigates against the idea that language is either 
purely material or arbitrarily non-material, that it is a property of interest groups, 
or that it is capable of infinite manipulation. Properly done, linguistics is capable 
of revealing both our astonishing abilities (particularly in exemplars like classic 
poets) and our animal propensities. But of course, expressed more rhetorically, this 
is simply the old humanist view that man is mid-way betwixt animal and angel. 
Linguistics has confirmed what was intuitively sensed all along - that the 
“Canon” was in fact fluid and also determined, with each poet strongly conforming 
while simultaneously de-constructing. This is to say that it was alive. Shakespeare 
was able to do what he did by means of an “inner ear” which both heard his pre-
decessors and yet found an unexplored country of sound all his own. The fact that 
it has taken years of research and highly complex metrical trees to decipher the 
intricate patterns executed out of sheer talent only emphasizes the fact. Apparently 
Canon formation was not arbitrary and rigid in the slightest. One had to have a tin 
ear to think that it would be to begin with. This is precisely what Paglia was argu-
ing, what Fish is re-thinking, and what Hopkins was stretching for in attempting 
to unite his inscape and instress, poetry and faith, mutable language and certainty. 
The difficulty, paradox, and one-in-manyness of it all strike our modern ways of 
thought as impossibly jumbled, but this is what “talking like the rain” entails and 
will always entail. Perichoresis is, after all, a theological term. Yet it need not be 
exclusively so. All this view needs is a return to a dynamic and free (but probably 
metaphysical) view of man. 
Contrariwise to the ars poetica and those who practiced it, the institutional 
West was sick of such endless debate and prattle. 
In 1866 the Societe Linguistique declared in its bylaws that it would not accept 
any communicate dealing with the question of the origin of language thereby of-
ficially ending, so it seemed, all inquiry into the thorny problem that had plagued 
many of the most illustrious (Rousseau, Herder, Vico, and Condillac) and not a 
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few of the less celebrated (Sussmilch, Maupertuis, and Lord Monboddo) minds of 
the previous century (Sprinker, 1980, p. 113). 
Practice poetry if you like, but do not attempt to formally link it with the 
divine. Not long before, it was not quite so 
In fact, it occurred to no one in Shakespeare’s time that words could be “defined.” 
A “logical definition” existed as a concept (e.g., in the mid-century work of Thomas 
Wilson) but concerned a thing in the world or something in experience. Elizabethans 
used definitions to describe objects. It was not then the practice to adopt a logical 
definition of the thing to which a hard word referred to explain that word. That is, 
lexicographers did not employ what we now call referential definitions, which describe 
the meaning of a word by referring to the logical definition of the thing that the word 
denoted. Words were widely regarded as straightforward signs or pointers to, or names 
for, things. (Lancashire, 2009)
 A bit simplistically, to them the origins of language obviously were divine, 
while the words themselves were known quantums of magic, although indefinable. 
To us, it is the other way around: language is obviously not divine, but basically 
human; it’s the magic inherent in the words which make us puzzled, although we 
can define them. They accepted the word, and puzzled over the Origin. We know 
the origin, but have trouble believing in words at all. Is it merely because of the 
flexibility of the language during Elizabethan transition that Shakespeare was able 
to invoke either/or meanings, “both sides now”, as meditations on the tragic and 
comic fate of man, the difference (for example) between barbarianism and civiliza-
tion, from Titus to Tempest (Rhodes, 2004, 200). Or is language sermonic no matter 
when, or how we live? “Talking like the rain”, as much as falling in love, seems to 
proceed without acknowledgement of the “state of the field”. 
Where does all this get us? A long way from dealing with the problems clearly, 
always at hand, in approaching any canonical (or candidate) piece of literature, 
indeed any work of art itself. Nevertheless, it may become more possible to assert 
that a genuine suspension of disbelief will require a deep sympathy with the pre-
conceptions and predilections of the author, no matter how foreign to our own, for 
it will in fact require that we admit the power of the scrap of paper or the smudged 
syllable to actually speak something across space and time that has a share in some-
thing bigger that we, too, are (and must be) interested in. Clearing the ground by 
examining differences allows for better filters and ultimately, comprehension. The 
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critical process is a prelude and handmaid to a Grecian “wholeness” in approaching 
a sub-creation in which we intend to share by also divesting ourselves of all too 
human tendencies which we tend to operate merely on the level of abstractions. 
In a larger sense, a failure to sympathize or understand creatively is an admission 
of guilt, that we do not share that portion of the other which could be expected 
to endure and to speak out of its worn materiality in order to invoke a similar 
transmutation in ourselves. It is in this sense that the old concept of the canon, 
buttressed with empirical studies of greater magnitude, may have something to 
offer us once again, since one forever retains and the other always helps to master, 
the power of continuity more fundamental than the distinctions with which we 
handle it. Empirical studies may awaken a more material and immediate sense of 
the uniqueness and power distilled in the “dead letter” of the past. 
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